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Evidence of Mental Disorder on Mens
Rea: Constitutionality of Drawing the
Line at the Insanity Defense
Harlow M. Huckabee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many jurisdictions authorize evidence of mental disorder to be ad-
mitted directly on mens rea.' This article is an analysis of the evi-
dentiary and constitutional issues involved in excluding mental
disorder evidence not meeting insanity defense requirements. Opin-
ions differ on whether it is constitutional to completely exclude such
evidence.2 Some courts have held that evidence of mental disorder
may not be sufficiently material, probative, relevant, competent, or
reliable to be admitted.3 Conversely, various authorities state that
such evidence should be admissible even though it does not meet the
requirements of the insanity defense. These authorities claim that
preclusion of this evidence may be unconstitutional.4
This article posits that, under appropriate circumstances, it is con-
stitutional to establish a general rule completely precluding mental
* J.D., Georgetown University, 1951; A.B. Harvard University, 1948. Former
Trial Attorney, Criminal Section, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice;
Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired);
Author of articles and a book on criminal law and psychiatry.
1. See generally Huckabee, Avoiding The Insanity Defense Strait Jacket: The
Mens Rea Route, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1-32 (1987).
2. Id. at 2. Relevant constitutional provisions include the clauses in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments stating that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty or
property without due process of law . U..." U S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. Also involved is a clause in the sixth amendment stating that the accused
shall "have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Although not focusing on mental disorder issues, two United States
Supreme Court cases cited frequently in the debates are Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973) and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
3. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 31.
4. Id. at 29; see also G. MELTON, J. PETRILA, N. POYTHRESS & C. SLOBOGIN, PSY-
CHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 128-30, 460 nn.125-26 (1987) [hereinafter
MELTON & PETRILA].
disorder evidence on mens rea below the insanity defense line. No
attempt is made here to pass judgment on whether admission of such
evidence should be authorized, despite many jurisdictions allowing it
in one form or another. However, for jurisdictions desiring to reduce
the use of mental disorder in criminal cases, this article demonstrates
that drawing a firm line at the insanity defense (as opposed to evalu-
ating the mental disorder evidence on a case-by-case basis) can be
constitutional. As discussed throughout this article, disagreement ex-
ists among jurisdictions, courts, and authorities which helps to
demonstrate that the issue does not reach constitutional dimensions.
An underlying consideration is that the insanity defense is needed
as a legal framework in order to place in context the evidence re-
garding mental disorder on mens rea. This provides juries with a tool
to evaluate mental disorders of defendants in terms of the legal re-
quirements as well. as render social and moral judgments.5 Evidence
of mental disorder going directly to mens rea, without an insanity de-
fense framework, tends to leave juries, courts, attorneys, and mental
health professionals adrift concerning the effect of the evidence on
the issue of responsibility.
Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court faced this
issue in Fisher v. United States;6 however, the Court did not hold
that excluding mental disorder evidence below the insanity defense
line is unconstitutional. 7 More recently, decisions in the Fifth,8 Sev-
3nth,9 Ninth,o and Eleventhl federal circuits have been consistent
with Fisher. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in four of these
cases. Furthermore, subject to frequently changing case law (includ-
ing cases emphasizing only expert opinions), thirteen states plus the
District of Columbia have refused to admit evidence of mental disor-
5. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 18-20, 81-82, 84-86, 89-92, 211-14
(1967); H. HUCKABEE, LAWYERS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND CRIMINAL LAW: COOPERATION OR
CHAOS?, 42-48, 61-63, 86, 91 (1980) [hereinafter HUCKABEE, COOPERATION OR CHAOS?];
cf. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 21, 27; Huckabee, Resolving The Problem of Dominance
of Psychiatrists in Criminal Responsibility Decisions: A Proposal, 27 Sw. L.J. 790, 792-
93, 798-99, 804-05 (1973) [hereinafter Huckabee, Problem of Dominance], reprinted in
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 7031, 7093, 7096-97, 7102-03, 7108-09 (1974) [hereinafter Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws].
6. 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
7. Id.
8. Welcome v. Blackburn, 793 F.2d 672, 674-75 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1985, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3245 (1987).
9. Brown v. Trigg, 791 F.2d 598, (7th Cir. 1986); Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124
(7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Worthing v. Israel, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
10. Wahrlich v. Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973).
11. Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1580-82 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1126 (1986).
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der on mens rea if it does not meet insanity defense requirements. 2
Constitutional attacks in these jurisdictions have been unsuccessful
in causing the Supreme Court to modify its position.
An in-depth discussion of extreme emotional disturbance, heat of
passion on sudden provocation, and similar concepts, is beyond the
scope of this article.13 However, cases involving these concepts will
be.discussed in other contexts.
II. LABELS
Various labels have been used to describe evidence of a mental dis-
order not meeting insanity defense requirements. They include di-
minished capacity, the mens rea model (including strict as well as
diminished capacity mens rea), and diminished responsibility.14 In
United States v. Pohlot,15 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit discussed variations of these labels in detail. The em-
phasis is on the mens rea model, which is referred to in the opinion
as "strict mens rea."x6 With reference to this concept, the court
noted: "Properly understood, it is ... not a defense at all but merely
a rule of evidence."17 The Supreme Court of New Jersey refers to
the mens rea model as the "mental state" model.' 8 However,
throughout this article the label "mens rea model" will be used to de-
scribe this rule of evidence.
Pohlot describes other concepts which function as "affirmative de-
fenses" to "excuse" misconduct instead of disproving an element of
the crime. These labels include: diminished capacity;19 partially di-
minished capacity (particularly as developed earlier in California);2 0
the diminished capacity defense;2 1 diminished responsibility;2 2 and
12. The 13 states are as follows: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 28-29. Maryland recently moved out of this group
and now allows such evidence on mens rea. Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 493-95, 536
A.2d 622, 632-33 (1988).
13. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975). Also, there will be no specific discussion in this article of defenses such as
those based on automatism or intoxication. See MELTON & PETRILA, supra note 4, at
126-27, 130-31.
14. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 1-12, 15-19, 22-26, 31-32.
15. 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
16. Id. at 897-900, 903-05.
17. Id. at 897 (footnote omitted).
18. State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 601, 532 A.2d 199, 204-05 (1987).
19. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 897-99, 903.
20. Id. at 903-05, 907.
21. Id. at 903.
the diminished responsibility defense. 23
III. PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI
In focusing on the development of issues before the Supreme
Court, reference will be made to documents filed with the Court in
three cases in which petitions for writs of certiorari have been de-
nied. The first case, Muench v. Israel,24 is an opinion by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upholding the consti-
tutionality of Wisconsin's exclusion of mental disorder evidence not
meeting insanity defense requirements. The appellants in the case
were Robert Muench and Richard Worthing.25 Because Worthing
filed the writ petition, his name was used in the Supreme Court's de-
nial of certiorari. 26
In their brief in opposition to the Worthing writ petition,27 attor-
neys for the respondent, Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson C. La
Follette and Assistant Attorney General Thomas J. Balistreri, made
two major points. They stated that no substantial federal question
existed because:
A State May Constitutionally Refuse To Recognize A Defense Of Diminished
Capacity, Thereby Rendering The Expert Evidence Irrelevant, [and] Expert
Opinion Testimony On A Defendant's Capacity To Intend To Commit A
Crime Is Sufficiently Unreliable That The Federal Constitution Permits The
States To Experiment With Rules Of Evidence Restricting Or Excluding Its
Admission.2 8
The brief in opposition asserts that the former point is "a matter of
substantive law" 29 whereas the latter point refers to the right of
states to "compel a criminal defendant to comply with rules of evi-
dence reasonably designed and applied to insure reliability in the
truth-determining process."3 0 The brief emphasizes that these pro-
vide "two discrete bases for the state exclusionary rule" and thus,
should one fail, review should still be denied by the Supreme
Court.31
22. Id. at 898, 903-05.
23. Id at 903. Diminished responsibility is also sometimes called partial responsi-
bility. State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 601, 532 A.2d 199, 204 (1987).
24. 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Worthing v. Israel, 467 U.S.
1228 (1984).
25. Id.
26. 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
27. Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Muench v. Israel,
715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1983) (No. 83-6358), cert. denied sub nom. Worthing v. Israel,
467 U.S. 1228 (1984) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition].
28. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at i.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 3. It may not be completely clear that an "affirmative defense" excusing
misconduct is involved and thus, whether or not the substantive law approach would
be appropriate. Cf. supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. In case law and litera-
ture, the distinction is not always clear between an affirmative defense and the mens
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In the second case, Welcome v. Blackburn,32 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
Louisiana's exclusion of mental disorder evidence not meeting in-
sanity defense requirements. The United States Supreme Court
again denied certiorari. 33
In answer to Welcome's petition for a writ of certiorari, an opposi-
tion brief was filed by respondent's attorneys: William J. Guste, Jr.,
Attorney General of Louisiana; Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr., District
Attorney, Sixteenth Judicial District, New Iberia, Louisiana; and
Dracos D. Burke, Assistant District Attorney.3 4 Because of a timing
problem, a regular brief in opposition was not filed. Instead, the op-
position to the petition for certiorari incorporated by reference the
"Brief On Behalf Of Respondent-Appellee" previously filed by
Messrs. Boudreaux and Burke with the Fifth Circuit.35
The Fifth Circuit brief emphasizes the constitutionality of refusing
to recognize the defense of diminished capacity.3 6 This approach is
consistent with the substantive law position referred to in the brief in
opposition to the Muench-Worthing petition. 37 The Fifth Circuit
brief also uses language consistent with the Muench-Worthing brief
in opposition 38 regarding preclusion of mental disorder for eviden-
tiary reasons. This includes the statement that "evidence of mental
disability short of legal insanity cannot negate specific intent or re-
duce the degree of the crime."3 9
rea model (rule of evidence) concept. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
Cf State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 599-604, 532 A.2d 199, 203-06 (1987). The problem
can be resolved by considering both the substantive law approach and the use of evi-
dentiary reasoning.
For a comprehensive discussion and different point of view regarding a number of
issues in this article, see generally Note, Restricting The Admission Of Psychiatric Tes-
timony On A Defendant's Mental State: Wisconsin's Steele Curtain, 1981 Wis. L. REV.
733-89. Since publication of the above-mentioned article, Muench-Worthing has been
decided by the Seventh Circuit and certiorari has been denied by the United States
Supreme Court. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
32. 793 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1985 (1987), reh'g denied,
107 S. Ct. 3245 (1987); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
33. Id.
34. Opposition to Petition for Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and Response for Application For Stay, ,Welcome v. Blackburn, 793
F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-4546), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1985 (1987), reh'g denied,
107 S. Ct. 3245 (1987) (No. 86-5544) [hereinafter Fifth Circuit briefi.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 18-21.
37. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text.
39. Fifth Circuit brief, supra note 34, at 8; see also id. at 16-21.
The Fifth Circuit brief submitted by the Louisiana officials to the
Supreme Court was successful in opposing certiorari in Welcome.
Because certiorari in Welcome was denied in 1987, the Supreme
Court also had the benefit of the earlier Muench- Worthing litigation,
including the brief in opposition to the Worthing petition.40
The third case, United States v. Pohlot,41 is an opinion by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which focuses
on the 1984 Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act.4 2 The court
opined that the subject under consideration here raised a significant
constitutional issue. However, the decision avoided a firm position on
the constitutional question. The defendant, Pohlot, was convicted in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and his conviction was affirmed by the Third Circuit. There-
after, he filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court; the Solicitor General waived the right of the federal
government to file a response to that petition; on January 11, 1988,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 43
In evaluating the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Pohlot it
is important to remember both the earlier denials of certiorari in
Muench-Worthing and Welcome, as well as the Court's possession of
documents filed in connection with these earlier cases. 44 The prece-
dential value of denials of certiorari should not be overemphasized.
Nevertheless, evaluating the documents filed with the Supreme
Court can provide at least some indication of the Court's reasons and
rationale for such denials.
Consistent with the substantive law position,45 the court of appeals
in Pohlot held that concepts in the nature of affirmative defenses are
precluded by the 1984 Act.46 These include diminished capacity, par-
tially diminished capacity, the diminished capacity defense, dimin-
ished responsibility (also known as partial responsibility), and the
diminished responsibility defense.47 In addition, the Third Circuit
added to this list the use of psychiatric evidence regarding the de-
fendant's subconscious motivation. In reference to this, the Pohlot
court stated: "Pohlot therefore offered his evidence of mental abnor-
mality in support of a legally unacceptable theory of lack of mens rea
that amounts covertly to a variation of the partially diminished ca-'
40. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
41. 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
42. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984).
43. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.
1987) (No. 87-857), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
44. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 28-29, 36-37 and accompanying text.
46. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 890-91, 903-07.
47. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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pacity defense .... 48
On the other hand, the Pohlot court agreed with the defense that
the 1984 Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act did not prevent the
defendant from introducing evidence of mental abnormality to dis-
prove an element of the crime under the mens rea model.49 The
opinion states that an evidentiary rule, having the effect of barring
all evidence of mental abnormality on the issue of mens rea, "may be
unconstitutional so long as we determine criminal liability in part
through subjective states of mind. '50 Nevertheless, the court noted
that "[e]ven the cases upholding the exclusion of psychiatric evidence
on mens rea ... would appear to justify a blanket exclusion in fed-
eral cases only if Congress had determined that psychiatric evidence
on the issue of mens rea was inherently irrelevant or unreliable."51
The Pohlot opinion avoided a decision on the constitutional issue,
stating: "We do not decide the constitutionality of any Congressional
attempt to bar evidence of mental abnormality from the issue of
mens rea."52 Nevertheless, the Court did preclude the mental disor-
der, in effect relying on the substantive law position.5 3 Because of
this preclusion, Pohlot petitioned the Supre'e Court for a writ of
certiorari which was denied.
Expressing reservations on the constitutional issue, Pohlot refers to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Fisher, and federal appellate cases
which have rejected constitutional challenges to the exclusion of psy-
chiatric evidence on the issue of mens rea. The opinion states:
"These cases do not distinguish . . .as Congress has done, between
the use of evidence to negate mens rea and a broader diminished ca-
pacity defense."54 Nevertheless, it can be argued that these cases (as
well as the cases in thirteen states and the District of Columbia) a5
base their positions on the substantive law approach,56 evidentiary
reasoning,57 or a combination of the two.
It is important to reiterate that the issues were made clear to the
48. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 907; see also id& at 890, 906.
49. Id. at 890, 895-903; rf supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
50. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 901 (footnote omitted).
51. 1& at 902 n.12 (emphasis added).
52. Id, at 903.
53. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
54. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 902 n.12.
55. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 28-29; see supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 28-29, 37, 45-48, 53 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 28, 30, 38, 51-52 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 31, stat-
ing that a combination of the substantive law and evidentiary approaches is preferable.
Supreme Court in the Muench-Worthing case in terms of (1) the sub-
stantive law approach and (2) the use of mental disorder evidence to
negate mens rea.58 Thus, despite the reasoning in the lower courts,
the Supreme Court in both Muench-Worthing and Welcome had the
opportunity to focus on the appropriate distinctions and concepts in
denying certiorari in those cases.
As noted earlier, the Third Circuit approved of precluding mental
disorder evidence in Pohlot, in effect using only the substantive law
position, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 59 Thus, the
Supreme Court's action in Pohlot is consistent with the denials of cer-
tiorari in Muench-Worthing and Welcome. However, with reference
to the evidentiary basis for precluding mental disorder evidence di-
rectly on mens rea, it is important to remember the denials of certio-
rari in Muench-Worthing and Welcome. In both of these cases, the
documents submitted to the Supreme Court focused on evidentiary
reasoning as well as the substantive law approach.6 0
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPROACH
The brief in opposition to the Worthing petition asserts that the
first basis for excluding mental disorder evidence below the insanity
defense line is that the diminished capacity defense can be precluded
as a matter of substantive law.6 1 The brief states that, in addition to
an evidentiary rationale, this appears to be the basis for the position
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Steele v. State.6 2 Further, in
Muench-Worthing the Seventh Circuit "found it necessary to con-
sider only the substantive justification for Steele's exclusionary
rule."63 As already noted, the Pohlot decision is also consistent with
this approach.6 4
As to the substantive law approach stated in the Worthing brief in
opposition,65 the Seventh Circuit concluded: "[A] state is not constitu-
tionally compelled to recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity
and hence a state may exclude expert testimony offered for the pur-
pose of establishing that a criminal defendant lacked the capacity to
form a specific intent."6 6 The brief further points out 67 that this de-
cision was based on Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v. United
58. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
61. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 1, 4.
62. Id. at 3-4; see Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
63. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 4-5; see Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124,
1144-45 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
64. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 889; see supra notes 45-48, 59 and accompanying text.
65. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 4-5.
66. Muench, 715 F.2d at 1144-45.
67. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 4-5.
[Vol. 16: 573, 1989] Evidence of Mental Disorder on Mens Rea
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
States6S and the Court's orders in Coleman v. California69 and
Troche v. California.70
The brief in opposition argues that "[t]he cases on which the Sev-
enth Circuit relied [cited in the foregoing paragraph] are not ripe for
reexamination merely because... [the Supreme Court] has more re-
cently recognized the constitutional dimensions of a defendant's right
to present relevant and competent evidence in his defense."71 The
brief further states: "No one disputes the right to present such evi-
dence to prove facts which constitute a recognized defense to crimi-
nal liability. But the initial question here is of a completely different
nature, whether a state must recognize diminished capacity as a de-
fense."72 Referring to the 1946 Fisher case,73 the brief notes that
"[n]one of the changes in criminal and constitutional law since 1946
suggest that a state might now be required to fundamentally change
the common law theory of responsibility." 74 The brief argues:
If diminished capacity is not a valid defense, expert psychiatric opinion evi-
dence that a defendant lacked the capacity to form an intent to commit a
crime ... is not relevant to a proper issue in the case. There can be no serious
dispute that irrelevant evidence may be excluded, even when offered by a
criminal defendant.75
The Fifth Circuit brief76 discusses use of the mens rea model and
contains language consistent with the substantive law approach 77 to
support precluding mental disorder evidence below the insanity de-
fense line. The brief asserts that "[t]his long-standing principle of
Louisiana law does not offend traditional notions of justice under the
federal constitution. s78 In support of this position the brief quotes
the Supreme Court's opinion in Patterson v. New York:79
68. 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
69. 317 U.S. 596 (1942).
70. 280 U.S. 524 (1929).
71. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 5.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946); see supra notes 6-7.
74. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 5.
75. Id. On the other hand, Professor Paul H. Robinson points out that some cases
and statutes say that even where evidence of mental disorder does not constitute a de-
fense, it is still relevant and admissible on mens rea. See 1 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENSES § 64(a), at 273-74 n.3 (1984 & Supp. 1988); see also id. at 277-78 n.13; id.
§ 64(d), at 283-84. However, such cases and statutes refer to the mens rea model in-
volving evidentiary reasoning, a topic where there is much divergence of opinion. Cf.
supra notes 16-18, 28, 30-31, 38-39, 49-52, 58, 60 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
78. Fifth Circuit brief, supra note 34, at 17.
79. 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (Court discuss-
ing jury instruction requiring the state carry the burden of production and persuasion).
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more
the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government and that we
should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the admin-
istration of justice by the individual States. Among other things, it is nor-
mally 'within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its
laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the bur-
den of persuasion,' and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription
under the Due Process Clause unless it 'offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.'8 0
In further support of this position, the Fifth Circuit briefsl cites
the Supreme Court's opinion in Fisher v. United States,82 and several
court of appeals opinions: Muench v. Israel,83 Wahrlich v. Arizona,8 4
and Campbell v. Wainwright.8 5 Commenting that "[d]espite much
discussion in recent years concerning the wisdom of adopting the 'di-
minished capacity' rule, Louisiana still retains the 'all or nothing'
concept of the M'Naghten case,"8 6 the brief concludes: "Under the
principles of Fisher v. United States . . .and Patterson v. New York
... this choice is within the prerogatives of the legislature of the sov-
ereign state of Louisiana, and should not be disturbed."8 7
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The previous discussion focused on the substantive law approach.
The next section will discuss evidentiary reasoning. These sections
cover the authority of the states to administer their own criminal law
systems and procedures, and to draw the line at the insanity defense
without violating the constitution. This section focuses on the policy
reasons which have led some jurisdictions to conclude that drawing
that line is desirable. It is undoubtedly these policy considerations
that cause some jurisdictions to use the substantive law approach and
evidentiary reasoning in order to draw the line at the insanity
defense.
The cases and authorities focusing on policy reasons take the posi-
tion that even if evidence of mental disorder below the insanity de-
fense line may be material, probative, relevant, competent, and
reliable, it may still be precluded from admission for significant pol-
icy reasons without violating the constitution.8 8
80. Fifth Circuit brief, supra note 34, at 17-18 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-
02 (citations omitted)).
81. Id. at 18-20.
82. 328 U.S. 463 (1946); see supra notes 6-7.
83. 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Worthing v. Israel, 467 U.S.
1228 (1984).
84. 479 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973).
85. 738 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1126 (1986).
86. Fifth Circuit brief, supra note 34, at 20 (citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d
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One major policy consideration involves the objective theory of
criminal liability. Under this theory, inferences drawn from both the
nature of the offense and the surrounding acts are used to demon-
strate the existence of mens rea. Consideration of mental illness is
not authorized unless it is presented under the insanity defense.8 9
Thus, instead of evaluating mens rea subjectively, based on possible
minor mental disorders, the mental disorders must meet the mini-
mum threshold of the insanity defense.
Policy considerations are sometimes expressed in broad and sweep-
ing terms. For example, in Muench-Worthing, the Seventh Circuit
analyzed positions taken in other cases and stated:
[I]njecting questions about mental abnormalities into a trial on first-degree
murder detracts attention from the real issues and has as its basis a theory
about culpability which the court is unprepared to accept against the interwo-
ven and delicately crafted fabric of its substantive definitions of murder, its
view of scienter, its conception of insanity, its assessment of the limitations of
jurors, and its evaluation of the state of the developing discipline of
psychology. 9 0
In rejecting evidence of mental disorder below the insanity defense
line other courts have made similar broad statements. 91
Another policy consideration is the potential danger to the commu-
nity. Some courts and authorities recognize that some defendants,
acquitted following a determination of lack of mens rea based on
mental disorder not meeting insanity defense requirements, cannot
be released without endangering public safety. Some authorities con-
tend that civil commitment may not be sufficient protection of the
public.92 In State v. Wilcox,9 3 the Supreme Court of Ohio summa-
1124, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Worthing v. Israel, 467 U.S. 1228
(1984); Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub noa.
Israel v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); Wahrlich v. Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137, 1138 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973); Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 84-85, 294 N.W.2d
2, 7-8 (1980).
89. Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 87-88 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1977); State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 1982); A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 5, at 191-202; Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility
Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 856-61 (1977);
Huckabee, supra note 1, at 5.
90. Muench, 715 F.2d at 1143.
91. State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 198-99, 436 N.E.2d 523, 533 (1982); Stamper
v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 716-17, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (1985).
92. People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 328-30, 583 P.2d 1308, 1315-16, 149 Cal. Rptr.
265, 272-73 (1978); Bethea, 365 A.2d at 85, 90-92; Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d at 196-99, 436
N.E.2d at 532-33; 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 314 (2d ed. 1980 & ch. 7,
Supp. 1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at .202, 206-07;
Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Uncon-
scious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 1039-42 (1982) [hereinafter Morse, Experts and the Uncon-
rized statements in Bethea,94 Fisher,9 5 and comments by Professor
Goldstein96 regarding the danger to public safety. The Wilcox court
concluded that excluding mental disorder evidence below the in-
sanity defense line may be supported as a matter of policy in order to
protect society.
A further policy consideration, mentioned by some courts, involves
the effect in the guilt phase of bifurcated trials of admitting mental
disorder evidence not reaching the insanity defense level. In Steele v.
State,97 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin referred to "safeguards
designed for the protection of the defendant, as well as of society"
and to "the problems of the duplicative evidence in the various stages
of the bifurcated trial which result in cumulative evidence and jury
confusion."98
Policy matters are important in supporting decisions to draw the
line at the insanity defense. Thus, courts should consider policy in
their reasoning, in addition to the substantive law and evidentiary
approaches.
VI. EVIDENTIARY REASONING
As noted earlier, the emphasis according to Pohlot is on the admis-
sibility of evidence under the mens rea model.99 However, it is also
significant that Pohlot recognizes the possibility that a blanket exclu-
sion of mental disorder evidence below the insanity defense line
might be justified "if Congress had determined that psychiatric evi-
dence on the issue of mens rea was inherently irrelevant or unrelia-
ble." 0 0 Pohlot did not rule on the constitutionality of a blanket
exclusion as the court had reservations about this issue.101
This section demonstrates that, despite reservations on the consti-
tutional issue expressed in Pohlot, various courts have held that
mental disorder evidence on mens rea below the insanity defense line
is so inherently irrelevant and unreliable that a blanket exclusion is
not unconstitutional. This is consistent with the position argued by
Wisconsin and Louisiana officials in the documents filed with the
scious]. But see United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1001-02 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
banc); Morse, Undiminished Confusion In Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9, 13-17, 22 (1984) [hereinafter Morse, Undiminished Confusion].
93. 70 Ohio St. 2d at 196-99, 436 N.E.2d at 531-33.
94. 365 A.2d at 84-85, 90-92.
95. Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 463
(1946).
96. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 202.
97. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
98. Id at 97, 294 N.W.2d at 13-14; cf. Note, supra note 31, at 734, 739, 756, 781-86.
99. See supra notes 15-18, 49, 52, 54 and accompanying text.
100. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 902 n.12; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court in Muench-Worthing and Welcome; certiorari was
denied in both cases.102 As stated in the 1988 supplement to Profes-
sor Robinson's treatise: "Exclusion of evidence that is either unrelia-
ble or that is not relevant to the mental state or states that are
elements of the offense charged does not raise constitutional
issues."103
The term "inherently irrelevant" involves the definition of rele-
vance under the rules of evidence, which also encompass the concepts
of materiality and probativeness. The term "inherently unreliable" is
a broad concept incorporating the lack of reliability of mental health
professionals in rendering expert opinions regarding the effect of
mental disorder on mens rea below the insanity defense line. This
involves the purported lack of competency of mental health profes-
sionals (under the rules of evidence) to render expert opinions on
this issue. Also contributing to the lack of reliability are any defi-
ciencies in mental disorder evidence under other rules of evidence, as
well as the inherent nature of mental disorder evidence.
A. Reliability
Beyond the specific requirements of rules of evidence involving
materiality, probativeness, relevance, and competency, is the broader
issue of whether the evidence is "reliable." Thus, the brief in opposi-
tion to Worthing's petition for certiorari refers to the right of states
to require defendants "to comply with rules of evidence reasonably
designed and applied to insure reliability in the truth-determining
process." 10 4 The brief further says that "[t]he unreliability of psychi-
atric opinion testimony relating to the mental state of a criminal de-
fendant has been well documented."o5
The reliability concept has been specifically discussed by the
Supreme Court in reference to hearsay evidence. As stated by the
Court in Chambers v. Mississippi,106 "untrustworthy evidence should
not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are
traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of .
reliability."107 The Chambers opinion further states that there must
be compliance "with established rules of procedure and evidence
102. See supra notes 28, 30-31, 39, 60 and accompanying text.
103. 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 75, § 64(a), at 37 n.13 (Supp. 1988).
104. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 2.
105. Id.
106. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
107. Id. at 298.
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment
of guilt and innocence."' 0 8 Other courts have extended this concept
to mental disorder evidence below the insanity defense line, 0 9 citing
FisherllO for support.
Unreliability is particularly a problem in opinions of mental health
professionals involving psychodynamic psychology. Professor Ste-
phen Morse, psychologist and lawyer,111 writes that "psychodynamic
formulation[s] [are] . . . unverifiable and unreliable causal account[s]
S.. [providing] the factfinder with little more than a false sense of
security based on the incorrect assumption that a reasonably accurate
scientific explanation has been provided."112 He states that
"[p]sychodynamic formulations are so inherently unreliable that they
cannot aid decision-making in the criminal justice system. They
should not be admitted at trials, at sentencing hearings, or at any
other stage of the criminal process."" 3
However, Professor Morse states that there is room for contribu-
tions by mental health professionals. He notes that "mental health
professionals are acute observers of behavior and can therefore effi-
ciently provide the rich behavioral data--observations about
thoughts, feelings, and actions-that are necessary to decide mental
health law questions.""14 He also states that these experts can "pres-
ent quantitative data based on empirical studies using reasonably
sound methodologies to help triers of fact understand the effect crazi-
ness exerts on other behavior.""5
Despite the more limited admissibility of testimony of mental
health professionals advocated by Professor Morse, various jurisdic-
tions go further and preclude such testimony on mens rea below the
insanity defense line." 6 Thus, even the limited admissibility pro-
posed by Professor Morse would produce disagreement in these juris-
dictions in the context of mental disorder evidence on mens rea
below the insanity defense line. Perhaps these jurisdictions subscribe
to the following statement by Professor Morse: "Three basic factors
probably are primarily responsible for the battle of the experts: the
softness of mental health theory, data, and collection methods; the
108. Id. at 302.
109. See Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 86-89 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977); Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 95-97, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13 (1980).
110. 328 U.S. 463 (1946); see supra notes 6-7.
Ill. See Morse, Experts and the Unconscious, supra note 92, at 971.
112. Id. at 1026.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 983.
115. Id.; cf id. at 979, 1045, 1055-56 (speculation, theoretical disagreement among
mental health experts, and the "softness" of mental health data, theory, and collection
methods, all contribute to the unreliability and unverifiability of mental health expert
testimony).
116. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
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nonscientific character of legal issues; and the inevitable bias of
mental health experts as they enter the criminal justice system as ad-
vocates."11 7 Professor Morse's statement is consistent with the argu-
ment that testimony and opinions of mental health professionals are
inherently unreliable regarding the effect of mental disorder on
mens rea below the insanity defense line. To reiterate, this is consis-
tent with the latter point of the brief in opposition to the Worthing
petition for a writ of certiorari, which referred to the evidentiary ba-
sis (involving unreliability) for precluding expert opinion testimony
on the mental capacity to form intent.'18
Set forth below are discussions of the related rules of evidence.
Deficiencies in mental disorder evidence under these rules contribute
to the unreliability of such evidence.
B. Materiality
To be material, evidence must tend to influence the trier of fact be-
cause of a logical connection to the issue under consideration. It
must have an effective influence or bearing on that issue.11 9
C. Probativeness
Probative evidence tends to prove, or actually proves, an issue.120
Professors John Kaplan and Jon Waltz note that the first ingredient
of relevance is materiality, and the second ingredient is probative-
ness. 12 1 They assert that in order to determine probativeness the fol-
lowing question should be asked: Does "the evidence tend to establish
the material fact-proposition?"122 Alternatively, "[d]oes the offered
evidence tend to make the fact-proposition more probably true or un-
true, than it would be without that evidence?"l23
In Steele v. State,124 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered
117. Morse, Experts and the Unconscious, supra note 92, at 1055; see also Faust &
Ziskin, The Expert Witness In Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 Sci. 31 (July 1, 1988).
But cf. Note, supra note 31, at 735, 751-53, 756-70.
118. See supra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text.
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (definition of "material evi-
dence"); cf J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, BASIC MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 8 (1980)
[hereinafter KAPLAN & WALTZ] (focus is on "the wording of the charge against the de-
fendant, the rulings of the trial judge, and the stipulations of the prosecuting attorney
and the defense counsel").
120. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1082 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
121. KAPLAN & WALTZ, supra note 119, at 8.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980); see supra notes 62, 97-98.
expert opinion testimony regarding the defendant's mental capacity
to form criminal intent. Referring to Fisher,125 the court noted the
Supreme Court "questioned the probativeness of psychiatric evidence
which tended to cast doubt upon the defendant's intent and
premeditation." 126
The Steele opinion pointed out that criminal responsibility is "es-
sentially a moral issue."127 The court then stated:
To make that [criminal responsibility under the insanity defense] determina-
tion requires no fine tuning. It is, rather, a gross evaluation that a person's
conduct and mental state is so beyond the limits of accepted norms that to
hold him criminally responsible would be unjust. This is a far cry from ac-
cepting testimony which purports to prove or disprove a specific intent, as dis-
tinguished from criminal responsibility. While some courts may have blind
faith in all phases of psychiatry, this court does not. There is substantial doubt
whether evidence such as was sought to be introduced here is scientifically.
sound, and there is substantial legal doubt that it is probative on the point for
which it was asserted in this case. 12
8
The concept of probativeness may cause evidence to be excluded
even if it otherwise meets evidentiary requirements. For example,
rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 129 In the
area of mental disorder below the insanity defense line there is par-
ticularly a problem of confusing the issues and misleading the jury.
D. Relevance
To be relevant, evidence must have a tendency to make the exist-
ence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
case either more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. Evidence is relevant if reasonable inferences can be
drawn from it regarding a contested matter. This is true not only
when the evidence tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue, but also
when it tends to establish a fact from which the existence or nonexis-
tence of a fact in issue can be directly inferred.s0 As noted by
Professors Kaplan and Waltz, "materiality and probativeness, taken
in combination, add up to relevance.1 3 1
125. 328 U.S. 463 (1946); see supra notes 6-7.
126. Steele, 97 Wis. 2d at 95, 294 N.W.2d at 13 (emphasis added).
127. Id at 96, 294 N.W.2d at 13.
128. Id. at 96-97, 294 N.W.2d at 13 (emphasis added).
129. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added); see also 1 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE
§ 4:6 (6th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1987).
130. FED. R. EVID. 401; 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 91 (14th ed.
1985 & Supp. 1986); 1 S. GARD, supra note 129, §§ 4:2, 4:4, 4:5; BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1160 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
131. KAPLAN & WALTz, supra note 119, at 8-9.
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An example of the relevance problem occurs when claims of
mental disorder regarding lack of volition are made which are not
relevant to cognitively oriented criminal law concepts. 3 2 Various au-
thorities have recognized that "volitional difficulties simply do not
negate the cognitive mental states, such as intent and knowledge,
that are required elements of criminal culpability."133
E. Competency
As stated by Kaplan and Waltz: "Even if both branches of the rele-
vance question (materiality and probativeness) can be answered in
the affirmative, there still remains a large additional question: Is the
offered evidence nonetheless incompetent (inadmissible) because of
some special exclusionary rule of law?"134 Citing hearsay as an ex-
ample, they say that "[e]vidence can be probative of a material issue,
[but can] ... still be excluded by some special rule because the partic-
ular type of evidence is thought to be generally unreliable .... 135
A significant problem in testimony of mental health professionals
directly on mens rea below the insanity defense line involves
whether they are competent under the rules of evidence to express
expert opinions on mens rea issues. Some courts draw the compe-
tency line of the mental health professionals at the insanity defense.
Others disagree, asserting mental health professionals are competent
to render opinions directly on mens rea. In any event, this compe-
tency issue may be considered one of the "special exclusionary rules"
which may exclude otherwise material and probative evidence.136
Thus, in discussing Steele v. State,137 the brief in opposition to the
Worthing petition states: "As a matter of the law of evidence, the
court excluded expert opinion testimony on the defendant's capacity
to form a criminal intent because it considered such testimony to be
incompetent, due to substantial doubt about its trustworthiness and
reliability."138
132. Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role Of Mental Health Professionals In The Criminal
Process: The Case For Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 473 n.142 (1980).
133. Morse & Cohen, Diminishing Diminished Capacity In California, 2 CAL.
LAW., 24 (June 1982); cf Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 92, at 41.
134. KAPLAN & WALTZ, supra note 119, at 9.
135. Id.; see also 1 S. GARD, supra note 129, § 1:4 (evidence is "competent" when it
is "relevant, material, and not barred by any exclusionary rule"); BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 257 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
136. KAPLAN & WALTZ, supra note 119, at 9.
137. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 92-97, 294 N.W.2d 2, 11-13 (1980).
138. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 4 (citation omitted).
A fundamental consideration is that even in testifying under the
existing insanity defense, many mental health professionals say that
they are beyond their area of expertise. Thus, the obvious question
is: How can they be experts on mens rea elements which move even
further into legal issues and the intricacies of criminal law?139 The
problem is highlighted by the testimony of psychiatrist Loren Roth
before a congressional subcommittee. Roth was the chairperson of
the Insanity Defense Work Group which prepared the December,
1982 American Psychiatric Association Statement On The Insanity
Defense.140 Roth testified before a subcommittee of the United
States House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, 141 and he com-
mented on the so-called "mens rea insanity defense," then pending
before Congress. However, his statements are also particularly appli-
cable to diminished capacity, the mens rea model, and similar con-
cepts. In his testimony, Roth opined that under the mens rea
insanity defense approach "psychiatrists would have to be making
judgments about intent, which they should not and cannot do."142
Referring to articles by Professor Stephen Morse 143 and Doctor
Charles R. Clark,144 Roth argued:
These papers spell out in great detail the limitations and problems, and really
the clinical nonsense that are involved in having psychiatrists testify as to who
or who does not have intent-which issue is even more ambiguous than the
traditional insanity defense standards under which we are presently work-
ing.... You should not have experts testifying in this gray area.1 45
Such statements raise questions regarding whether opinions of
mental health professionals on mens rea below the insanity defense
line are scientific enough to be admissible as expert testimony under
the legal rules of evidence. The often cited Frye v. United States146
notes that "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testi-
mony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
139. HUCKABEE, COOPERATION OR CHAOS?, supra note 5, at 43-45, 104-05, 109-10,
145-50; Huckabee, Problem of Dominance, supra note 5, at 797-98; Reform of the Fed-
eral Criminal Laws, supra note 5, at 7101-02.
140. Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement
On The Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681 (June 1983).
141. Insanity Defense In Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, 58-62 (1982)
[hereinafter Insanity Defense Hearings] (testimony of Dr. Loren Roth).
142. Id. at 59.
143. Morse, Diminished Capacity: A Moral And Legal Conundrum, 2 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 271 (1979).
144. Clark, Clinical Limits Of Expert Testimony On Diminished Capacity, 5 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 155 (1982).
145. Insanity Defense Hearings, supra note 141, at 59-60.
146. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (lie detector test held not to
be a judicially acceptable detection method). Cf. Ibn Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d
626, 637-38 (D.C. 1979).
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in which it belongs."'147 Under this test, in view of Roth's testimony,
do mental health professionals qualify as expert witnesses on mens
rea below the insanity defense line?
Actually the question is not whether a "science" is involved, but
whether the expert witness has specialized knowledge of the sub-
ject.148 The basic conditions of expert testimony are that opinions,
inferences or conclusions of an expert witness must depend upon: (1)
"special knowledge, skill, or training not within the ordinary experi-
ence of lay jurors"; (2) qualification "as a true expert in the particu-
lar field of expertise"; (3) testimony "to a reasonable degree of
certainty (probability)" regarding [the] opinion, inference or conclu-
sion"; and (4) an adequate description of "the data (facts) on which
[the] opinion, inference or conclusion is based or, in the alternative,
... [testimony] "in response to a hypothetical question that sets forth
the underlying data."' 49
A statement in the commentary of an American Bar Association
criminal justice mental health standards committee notes: "Even if
critics of mental health and mental retardation professional opinion
evidence are correct in asserting that the operating theories underly-
ing psychiatry and psychology have not been verified scientifically,
rule 702 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] does not limit 'specialized
knowledge' to scientific knowledge." 15° Again, even under the less
stringent "specialized knowledge" rule, in view of Roth's testi-
mony,' 51 do mental health pkofessionals have sufficient specialized
knowledge to render opinions on mens rea below the insanity de-
fense line? There are varying opinions among courts, jurisdictions,
and authorities concerning this major issue. )
The aforementioned American Bar Association committee com-
mentary states that most courts have held that mental health profes-
sional testimony is admissible concerning a defendant's state of mind
when proof of specific intent is required. 5 2 The commentary states:
147. Frye, 293 F. at 1014; cf bn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 637-39; Dyas v. United States,
376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977).
148. See J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 807-08 (1987)
[hereinafter Kaplan & Waltz]; see also FED. R. EVID. 702; ABA STANDARDS, supra note
92, at 117 (ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-3.9(a) allows expert testi-
mony regarding mental condition when "the testimony is ... within the specialized
knowledge of the witness").
149. KAPLAN & WALTZ, supra note 148, at 808.
150. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 92, at 120.
151. See supra notes 141-42, 145 and accompanying text.
152. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 92, at 121.
"Expert opinion evidence from qualified professionals should be ad-
missible on a mens rea issue even if a defendant has not pleaded a
specific mental nonresponsibility [insanity] defense, as long as it is
relevant to a determination of guilt, innocence or level of culpabil-
ity."153 Nevertheless, as earlier stated, a number of jurisdictions disa-
gree and draw the line at the insanity defense. 154
In summary, the foregoing evidentiary discussion (involving mate-
riality,155 probativeness,156 and relevance 157 ) supports the argument
that evidence of mental disorder below the insanity defense line is
"inherently irrelevant."15 8 Additionally, the "inherently unrelia-
ble"159 position is supported by the foregoing discussion of incompe-
tency of mental health professionals to testify and render expert
opinions on mental disorder below the insanity defense line. 60
Other evidentiary deficiencies also contribute to the unreliability of
mental disorder evidence.161
VII. AVOID ARBITRARY OR MECHANISTIC DECISIONS
In order to preclude successful constitutional attacks, courts should
not make "arbitrary" or "mechanistic" decisions regarding the admis-
sibility of evidence. In other contexts this has been emphasized by
the United States Supreme Court.162 However, in view of the contro-
versial nature of mental disorder evidence below the insanity defense
line, and the reasonable arguments that may be made for its exclu-
sion, the Supreme Court has not ruled that it is arbitrary to do so. 1 63
Some courts have taken the position that if evidence of voluntary
intoxication is considered admissible to show lack of specific intent,
then evidence of mental disorder not meeting insanity defense re-
quirements should also be admissible.164 Other courts disagree with
this proposition. For example, in Wahrlich v. Amzona, 165 the United
'tates Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that precluding
such evidence of mental disorder and admitting evidence of intoxica-
tion on specific intent is not "an unreasonable or arbitrary
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 104-33 and accompanying text.
162. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (hearsay); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23-25 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
163. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
164. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
165. 479 F.2d 1137, 1138 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973).
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classification." 16
6
In Fisher v. United States,167 the United States Supreme Court was
presented with the "analogy to intoxication" argument; however, the
Court still held that precluding evidence of mental disorder below
the insanity defense line does not reach a constitutional dimension.168
Other courts which have faced the issue have held that because of
the problems involved in admitting mental disorder evidence below
the insanity defense line it can be distinguished from intoxication
and, hence, may be precluded.169
There is some merit to the argument stressing the analogy between
intoxication and the mens rea model in order to show that precluding
mental disorder on mens rea is an arbitrary decision. Nevertheless,
there are reasonable arguments advocating the opposite position, as
indicated in court decisions, including the Supreme Court.170
Another area in which it has been argued that decisions are arbi-
trary is where mental disorder evidence is excluded for some pur-
poses but admitted for others. The brief in opposition to the
Worthing petition for a writ of certiorari discusses this issue; if there
is a reasonable basis for believing that such testimony is unreliable,
then there is no constitutional reason for disturbing such a deci-
sion.171 The brief states: "Reasonable people can be convinced that
psychiatrists are competent to make some, but not any and all, deter-
minations about the mental processes of those who commit criminal
acts."172 The brief further argues that "evidence relevant to a de-
fense of diminished capacity may be virtually identical to that rele-
vant to a defense of insanity, but the purposes for which the evidence
is used are different. It is fundamental that the same evidence may
be admissible for one purpose but inadmissible for another."173
The issue is brought into focus by the Ohio Supreme Court in State
v. Wilcox,174 where the court stated that in view of the problem
courts and juries face when evaluating expert evidence to "make the
166. Id. at 1138.
167. 328 U.S. 463 (1946); see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
168. Fisher, 328 U.S. at 473-75.
169. Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 85-86, 88-89 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977); State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 186-87, 436 N.E.2d 523, 526 (1982);
Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 94-95 n.7, 294 N.W.2d 2, 12 n.7 (West 1980).
170. See supra notes 163, 165-69 and accompanying text.
171. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 9-10.
172. Id, at 10.
173. Id. at 10 n.3.
174. 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 436 N.E.2d 523 (1982); see supra notes 91-93.
'bright line' insanity determination, we are not at all confident that
similar evidence will enable juries, or the judges who must instruct
them, to bring the blurred lines of diminished capacity into proper
focus so as to facilitate principled and consistent decision-making in
criminal cases."17 5 Other courts have made similar rulings, and have
disagreed with the argument that because evidence of mental disor-
der is admissible on insanity it should also be admissible on mens rea
below the insanity defense line.176
On the other hand, there are arguments to the effect that since evi-
dence of mental disorder is admitted on other issues, including in-
sanity and competency to stand trial, it should also be admitted
directly on mens rea.177 Nevertheless, reasonable arguments may be
made both ways on this issue. Thus, the decisions are not arbitrary
and, under the law as it now exists, the issue does not reach constitu-
tional dimensions.
VIII. REMOVING BURDEN OF PROOF AND PERSUASION PROBLEMS
Earlier discussions have demonstrated that jurisdictions may con-
stitutionally draw the line at the insanity defense and preclude
mental disorder evidence on mens rea below that line. However,
many jurisdictions have variations of diminished capacity, diminished
responsibility, partial responsibility and the mens rea model incorpo-
rated in their criminal justice systems. If they decide to retreat from
these concepts and draw the line at the insanity defense, some of
them may have difficulty in doing so.
In order to draw a line at the insanity defense so as to completely
bar use of mental disorder evidence below that line, jurisdictions
need to review their criminal justice systems. Such review is neces-
sary to verify that mental disorder evidence on mens rea is not recog-
nized in a way that creates a constitutional problem involving the
requirement that the prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is best illustrated by a further discussion of
the Pohlot case.
The Pohlot opinion1 78 notes that the Court in In re Winship179
175. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d at 193, 436 N.E.2d at 530. But cf. Note, supra note 31, at
770-80.
176. Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1126 (1986); Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1136-37 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Worthing v. Israel, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72,
95-97, 294 N.W.2d 2, 12-13 (1980).
177. Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Israel v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 92,
at 10-11; cf Note, supra note 31, at 757-63.
178. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900-01 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 710 (1988).
179. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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held that due process requires the government to prove every ele-
ment of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.180 Pohlot then
acknowledges: "The defendant's right to present a defense to one of
those elements generally includes the right to the admission of com-
petent, reliable, exculpatory evidence, and the Supreme Court has
struck down 'arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense
witnesses from testifying.' "181 The Pohlot Court further stated that
"courts have focused not just on whether a state might determine the
evidence to be inherently unreliable or irrelevant but also on
whether the state had in fact made that judgment." 8 2
According to Pohlot, in the 1984 Insanity Defense Reform Act, Con-
gress and the Administration did make that judgment. The opinion
extensively discusses the legislative history of the Act, including Con-
gressional debates and hearings regarding attempts to abolish the in-
sanity defense.' 8 3 The opinion states that the "entire structure of the
Congressional debate suggests that Congress did not intend to bar ev-
idence of mental abnormality to prove a lack of mens rea."18 4 Fur-
ther, the legislative history "suggests that admitting psychiatric
evidence on the mens rea issue may be more relevant and reliable
than admitting it for the insanity defense." 85 Finally, Pohlot con-
cludes: "We are unwilling on our own to find this use of psychiatric
evidence inherently unreliable. ' ' 8 6
The Court emphasizes that Congress and the Administration did
not draw a firm line at the insanity defense and thus the mens rea
model exists in the legislation. Full confrontation of the constitu-
tional issue involved in completely banning mental disorder below
the insanity defense line was avoided; Pohlot ruled that the evidence
was inadmissible only under the substantive law approach.' 8 7 Thus,
the mens rea model is available for use by defendants in other fed-
eral criminal cases. Although other jurisdictions have drawn a firm
line at the insanity defense, 8 8 Congress and the Administration have
chosen not to draw that line.
180. Id. at 363-64.
181. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 900-01. In support of this, the Pohiot opinion cites Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); and Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
182. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 902 n.12.
183. Id. at 897-903.
184. Id. at 899.
185. Id. at 902 n.12.
186. Id,
187. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
It would seem that this decision will have a significant effect in
other federal prosecutions. As stated in Pohiot: "The government
contends that admitting evidence to prove a lack of mens rea effec-
tively places the burden of proving a defendant's sanity back on the
government."' 8 9 Notably, in light of this, the United States Solicitor
General filed a document with the Supreme Court waiving the gov-
ernment's right to file a response to Pohlot's petition for certiorari.190
In any event, it may now be very difficult for Congress and the Jus-
tice Department to eliminate the mens rea model from the federal
system even if such a desire exists.
Other jurisdictions may have similar problems in retreating from
the mens rea model. This will be particularly true if they have
adopted a "facts" of mens rea approach rather than a "mental capac-
ity" for mens rea approach. Some legal scholars urge that the mental
capacity concept be abandoned, allowing mental health professionals
to express opinions in terms of facts of mens rea.191
California has adopted such an approach. Section 28 subdivision (a)
of the California Penal Code states: "Evidence of mental disease,
mental defect, or mental disorder shall not be admitted to show or
negate the capacity to form any mental state." However, such evi-
dence is admissible "solely on the issue of whether or not the accused
actually formed" the required mental state.192 American Bar Associ-
ation Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-6.2 also appears to
have moved in this direction.193 Although it is not as specific as the
California statute in precluding mental capacity evidence, the 1984
Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act seems to lean toward Califor-
nia's facts of mens rea approach.194
A major problem exists with the movement toward attempting to
bracket mental disorder evidence below the insanity defense line into
a "facts" context rather than mental capacity. Mental health profes-
sionals are not experts regarding the facts of mens rea. Significant
authorities support this obvious fact and focus on the danger of intru-
sion by experts into the province of the jury.195
Some jurisdictions preclude opinions of experts on "ultimate is-
189. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 900.
190. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
191. Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 92, at 5, 42-52, 55-58; cf. Bonnie &
Slobogin, supra note 132, at 475-77 (arguing that relevant expert testimony should be
allowed to establish the plausibility of defendant's claim of abnormality).
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West 1988); cf Huckabee, supra note 1, at 8-15.
193. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 92, at 311-17; see also Huckabee, supra note 1, at
16.
194. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 903, 905.
195. Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 61-62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912
(1960); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632-33 (D.C. 1979); Stamper v. Com-
monwealth, 228 Va. 707, 715-16, 324 S.E.2d 682, 687-88 (1985); 2 S. GARD, supra note
129, § 14:27; cf Clark, supra note 144, at 168-70.
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sues." However, this does not cure the problem if, while avoiding ul-
timate issues, the expert moves into nonclinical, nonmedical, or
nonpsychological matters that are before the jury and, in the process,
weighs controversial factual issues, including credibility of factual
witnesses. Such matters are for the jury alone.196
It is true that mental capacity is logically relevant to the facts of
mens rea (i.e., if a defendant does not have the mental capacity for
mens rea he does not have the mens rea). However, some jurisdic-
tions do not agree that partially diminished capacity eliminates mens
rea. In any event, a number of jurisdictions believe that the law has
the right, for a variety of reasons, not to accept evidence of mental
disorder below the insanity defense line.1 97 The facts approach, as
described above, should not be built into the system if jurisdictions
desire to draw the line at the insanity defense. It presents the danger
of confusing real factual evidence with mental capacity. Mental
health professionals should be recognized for what they are-argua-
bly experts on mental capacity. However, even as to this proposition,
there are those who say they do not have sufficient expertise below
the insanity defense line. As noted above, it may be conceded that
mental capacity is arguably relevant to the facts of mens rea. How-
ever, jurisdictions are not necessarily required to build mental disor-
der evidence into their criminal justice systems in a manner that
makes it unconstitutional to preclude such evidence below the in-
sanity defense line.
A major hurdle in removing burden of proof and persuasion
problems is that jurisdictions may separate the mental capacity con-
cept from the elements of offenses. For example, mental capacity
may be separated so that there is not a constitutional right to pres-
ent mental capacity evidence on mens rea below the insanity defense
line. Thus, with proper separation from mens rea elements, the bur-
196. See generally supra note 195. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 132, at 475-77, ap-
pear to disagree with this position. However, they seem to be focusing on the "ulti-
mate issue" concept rather than on a second way an expert can preempt the jury's
function. This involves testimony by the expert witness on nonclinical matters which
may not be specifically focused on the ultimate issue. These are matters which the
jury. is just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw
the necessary conclusions. See Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 632-33. At another point in
their article, Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 132, at 480-81 n.161, recognize the distinc-
tion, however, by conceding that a mental health professional should not function as a
"thirteenth juror." Cf. MELTON & PETRILA, supra note 4, at 128-29.
197. These reasons were presented earlier under the substantive law, policy consid-
erations, and evidentiary reasoning discussions. See supra notes 61-161 and accompa-
nying text.
den of persuasion regarding mental capacity may even be placed on
the defendant. In support of this conclusion, six key points are
noteworthy.
First, as long as the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt
the elements of the crime charged, the prosecution is not required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt separate concepts which are not a
part of such elements.19s Second, the burden of persuasion for the
insanity defense which focuses on mental capacity may be placed on
the defendant.199 The defendant also may have the burden for the
extreme emotional disturbance concept involving actions of the de-
fendant "caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of in-
sanity . ."200
Third, it is noteworthy that in Louisiana the defendant has the
burden of persuasion to establish insanity under the insanity de-
fense.201 Nevertheless, in Welcome, the Supreme Court denied certi-
orari when the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the exclusion in Louisiana of mental disorder evi-
dence not meeting insanity defense requirements. 202 This was done
even though the burden of persuasion regarding insanity was on the
defendant.
Fourth, a statute which places the burden of persuasion regarding
diminished capacity on the defendant is not unconstitutional. This is
true as long as the state retains the responsibility of proving essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.203
Fifth, in a discussion of sections 25(a) and 28(a) of the California
Penal Code,204 Professor Morse states that "the legislature expressed
its belief ... that capacity evidence was not relevant to determining
whether a defendant actually had mens rea."205 Thus, he argues that
the defendant's capacity does not have to be an element that the
prosecution must prove, although the "prosecution still must prove
that the defendant actually had the requisite mens rea and the de-
fendant must be allowed to admit other relevant evidence that he did
not have it in fact."206 This is consistent with the point that mental
capacity does not have to be part of the elements required to be
198. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
199. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202-07; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952); United
States v. Byrd, 834 F.2d 145, 146 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419
(8th Cir. 1986). Cf Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 490-95, 536 A.2d 622, 630-33 (1988).
200. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206 (citation omitted).
201. State v. Andrews, 369 So. 2d 1049, 1053-54 (La. 1979). Cf. State v. Bouwman,
328 N.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Minn. 1982).
202. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
203. State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 612-13, 532 A.2d 199, 210 (1987).
204. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25(A), 28(A) (West 1988).
205. Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 92, at 44-45 & n.145 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
206. Id. at 45.
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proved under the constitution.207
Finally, Martin v. Ohio208 does not alter the conclusion that
mental capacity may be separated from the mens rea elements.
Pohlot maintains that, under Martin, a state may place the burden on
a defendant to prove self-defense. However, "a state's right to shift
the burden on self-defense does not include the right to prevent a de-
fendant from showing self-defense in an effort to prove that she did
not act with the mens rea of 'prior calculation and design.' "209 The
petition for rehearing filed with the Supreme Court in Welcome 210
made a similar argument. 211 Nevertheless, Martin dealt with the
facts involved in self-defense. Such facts may be very important in
demonstrating that a defendant did not actually have the requisite
mens rea. However, nothing in Martin precludes a jurisdiction from
separating mental capacity from the mens rea elements, thereby
avoiding a burden of proof problem. This is supported by Welcome,
where the Supreme Court denied a rehearing even though the Mar-
tin argument was made in the petition for rehearing.212
Nonetheless, in Leland v. Oregon,213 the Supreme Court implied it
may be constitutionally required for the jury to properly consider
mental disorder on mens rea if it does not meet insanity defense re-
quirements.214 Oregon law at that time authorized consideration of
mental disorder on mens rea elements below the insanity defense
line. Oregon is not one of the states that precludes such evidence be-
low that line.2 15 Thus, in Leland, the Supreme Court referred to the
trial court's instruction which authorized use of such residual mental
disorder evidence on mens rea. Nevertheless, this does not result in
207. However, as earlier discussed, California has created a special problem by giv-
ing what may be considered too much recognition to mental disorder evidence on the
facts of mens rea. This creates a constitutional problem that does not exist in jurisdic-
tions where mental health professionals are considered potential experts merely on
mental capacity, and thus in those jurisdictions the issue may be resolved on eviden-
tiary and policy bases rather than involving the Constitution.
208. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
209. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 901.
210. Petition for Rehearing of Order Denying Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Welcome v. Blackburn, 793 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir. 1986) (No. 85-4546), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1985 (1987), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3245
(1987). Petition for rehearing filed May 27, 1987, Supreme Court No. 86-5544.
211. Id. at 1-2.
212. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
213. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
214. Id. at 794-96.
215. Cf. supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. See also Huckabee, supra note 1,
at 28-29.
a constitutional requirement in those states which firmly and prop-
erly draw the line at the insanity defense.
Justice Rehnquist refers to Leland in his concurring opinion in
Mullaney v. Wilbur.2 16 The Supreme Court in Leland noted that the
insanity issue was considered only after the jury had "found that all
elements of the offense, including mens rea ... [as] required by state
law, had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'217 As recognized
by the trial court's instructions in Leland, "evidence relevant to in-
sanity as defined by state law may also be relevant to whether the
required mens rea was present, [however] the existence or nonexis-
tence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the exist-
ence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the
crime."218
An important point in Justice Rehnquist's statement is his refer-
ence to mens rea as required by state law. Although Oregon autho-
rizes consideration of mental disorder evidence, not meeting insanity
defense requirements, to be considered directly on mens rea,219 other
jurisdictions do not. Thus, it appears that Justice Rehnquist ac-
knowledged that some jurisdictions (including Oregon) require such
evidence.220
The Pohlot court referred to Leland and stated that the Supreme
Court "did not sanction, and probably would not sanction, a jury
charge that prevented a jury from considering evidence of mental ab-
normality in determining whether the state had proven premedita-
tion and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt."221 However, this
does not apply to all jurisdictions since the Leland Court was merely
making comments in the context of the Oregon mens rea require-
ments, where mental disorder evidence not meeting insanity defense
requirements was proper for jury consideration.222
Thus, comments regarding Leland and Mullaney,2 23 as well as sim-
ilar comments regarding New York by the Supreme Court in Patter-
son,224 appear to be merely recognizing the existence of the mens rea
model in these jurisdictions, rather than constitutional rulings. Juris-
dictions should still be able to constitutionally draw a firm line at the
216. 421 U.s. 684, 705-06 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 705-06 (emphasis added).
219. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
220. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204 (1977). The Supreme Court refers
to Leland and the requirement that in proving elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt "evidence going to the issue of insanity" should also be considered. Again,
however, it should be noted that New York is not one of the states that completely
precludes mental disorder evidence below the insanity defense line.
221. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 901.
222. Cf supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 216-18.
224. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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insanity defense. 225 This may be accomplished by using the afore-
mentioned substantive law approach, policy considerations, and evi-
dentiary reasoning.226 If this is done, and evidence of mental
disorder below the insanity defense line is removed from the mens
rea elements so as to avoid the burden of proof problem,227 a firm
line may be drawn at the insanity defense despite the comments in
Leland, Patterson, and Mullaney. However, if a jurisdiction has not
sufficiently separated mental disorder evidence, 228 then a constitu-
tional problem would arise if the rules in the particular jurisdiction
were not followed.
A related problem involves the type of jury instruction banned by
the Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana.229 The instruction in
Sandstrom was that "the law presumes that a person intends the or-
dinary consequences of his voluntary acts."230 Such instructions
should be avoided. It is of interest that in Sandstrom there was testi-
mony of mental health experts in terms of the mens rea model.
Again, however, this is because Montana was not a jurisdiction that
drew a firm line at the insanity defense.23 ' Thus, Sandstrom does
not add support to the argument that drawing the line at the insanity
defense is unconstitutional.
IX. MENS REA MODEL IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Special problems surround the mens rea model in the federal sys-
tem. These problems involve questions regarding the difficulty of re-
moving this model from the system, if desired. Another major issue
involves whether the model will be given a strict or diminished ca-
pacity mens rea interpretation. In varying degrees, such problems
undoubtedly exist in other jurisdictions where the mens rea model
has been adopted. Thus, a closer look at the federal system is
appropriate.
A. Is The Mens Rea Model Here To Stay?
As noted earlier, Congress and the United States Department of
Justice will have a difficult time if they now attempt to retreat from
225. Cf. supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 61-161 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 178-212 and accompanying text.
228. Cf. supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
229. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
230. Id at 515.
231. See supra notes 215, 220 and accompanying text.
the mens rea model. 232 The Justice Department has already made
such an unsuccessful attempt. In court arguments since the 1984 Act
was adopted, Department of Justice representatives have flatly taken
the position that the mens rea model is not within this legislation. In
effect, they have unsuccessfully reverted to an "all or nothing" posi-
tion regarding the legislation (i.e., if the mental disorder is not
presented under the insanity defense, it can be completely pre-
cluded). 23 3 The courts, however, have ruled against this argument,
stating that the mens rea model is built into the new legislation.234
232. See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
233. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 890-91, 897; United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1129-30
(D.D.C. 1987); United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see
also United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1079 (8th Cir. 1988); cf United States v.
Newman, 849 F.2d 156, 163-66 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1988).
234. See cases cited supra note 233; see also Huckabee, supra note 1, at 18-25. Note
particularly the references to the March 17, 1983 testimony before a congressional sub-
committee by then Assistant Attorney General (now federal District Judge) D. Lowell
Jensen. This testimony is specific legislative history regarding the Justice Depart-
ment's view of the proposed legislation. It is inconsistent with the position recently
taken by the Department in in-court arguments. See supra note 233 and accompanying
text.
It is also of interest that Congress passed a 1986 statute conforming military law to
the insanity defense provisions of the 1984 Federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act.
See Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 92-93 (C.M.A. 1988). Consistent with the position taken
by Department of Justice representatives in Pohlot, Gold, and Frisbee, the President
signed an Executive Order on March 3, 1987, which included language as follows:
A mental condition not amounting to a lack of mental responsibility under
subsection (k)(1) of this rule [i.e., the insanity defense] is not a defense, nor is
evidence of such a mental condition admissible as to whether the accused en-
tertained a state of mind necessary to be proven as an element of the offense.
Exec. Order No. 12,586, 3 C.F.R. 204, 207 (1988); cZf'Ellis, 26 M.J. at 92. This was incor-
porated as an amendment to the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES rule
916(k)(2) 1984, (Change No. 3, June 1, 1987).
Language similar to that in rule 916(k)(2) is essentially what was needed in the 1984
federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act (and in its legislative history) in order to
achieve the "all or nothing" result claimed by Justice Department representatives. See
cases cited supra note 233; cf 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 75, § 64(a), at 36 n.6 (Supp.
1988). However, such language was not in the act or the legislative history. Instead,
the legislative history includes the above-mentioned testimony of Mr. Jensen and
other Justice Department officials as well as statements in Senate reports which are
inconsistent with the language of rule 916(k)(2). Cf supra notes 181-90 and accompa-
nying text; see also infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
In view of this, it is not surprising that the United States Court of Military Appeals
held that in the military justice system an expert's testimony on specific intent, below
the insanity defense line, continues to be admissible. Futhermore, the President's
rule-making power does not extend to substantive military criminal law; and the provi-
sion in the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL which makes evidence of mental condition
below the insanity defense line inadmissible is a nullity. Ellis, 26 M.J. at 90. Although
the Court of Military Appeals expressed concern about the constitutional issue, it
stated that "we confine ourselves to construction of our own statute." Id. at 93 n.6.
The new insanity defense in the military law, as passed by Congress, closely tracks
the insanity defense in the 1984 federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act. S. REP.
No. 331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6413, 6444. Thus, the military law is wedded to the same legislative history as
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The pressure for a mens rea model actually dates back to 1973,
when the Justice Department first recommended that Congress
adopt a so-called "mens rea insanity defense." Since that time, de-
partment officials and Senate reports have stressed the merits of a
mens rea model as a replacement for a traditional affirmative in-
sanity defense.23 5
These representations by the Department of Justice and Senate re-
ports continued into the period shortly before the passage of the 1984
Act.23 6 As stated in Pohlot: "Even those favoring abolition... wished
to preserve the defendant's right to use psychiatric evidence to prove
lack of mens rea, and [Congress'] bills explicitly do so."237
In 1982, before a House of Representatives subcommittee, then-As-
sociate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani testified regarding the
proposed mens rea insanity defense. He was asked whether that ap-
proach would reduce the amount of psychiatric testimony in criminal
cases. Included in his answer was the following statement:
Those intents that you talk about are presently part of the law. They pres-
ently have to be proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt, and it
would presently be available to any defense lawyer to call psychiatrists to tes-
tify, that the person was unable to form the intent to commit the crime or to
form the specific intent that is required in the statute, so that our approach
certainly does not expand the number of opportunities to do that.2 3 8
Giuliani was obviously referring to the existing state of the law in the
federal system at that time. The Department of Justice was not tak-
ing the position, adopted in some jurisdictions, that a firm line could
be drawn at the insanity defense in precluding all mental disorder ev-
idence on mens rea below that line, using the substantive law ap-
the Federal Act. Ellis, 26 M.J. at 93. In order for the military to put into effect the
language of rule 916(k)(2), it appears that legislation will be required. However, there
may be difficulty in getting it through Congress in view of the climate created by the
legislative history of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act. For a comprehen-
sive analysis of these issues as they existed prior to Executive Order 12,586, the adop-
tion of rule 916(k)(2), and the Ellis decision, see generally Carroll, Insanity Defense
Reform, 114 MIL. L. REV. 183, 189, 196-211, 214-16, 223-24 (1986).
235. The Justice Department and the Senate appeared to have in mind a strict in-
terpretation of the effect of mental disorder on mens rea rather than a more defense
oriented concept such as diminished capacity mens rea or something similar. See gen-
erally Huckabee, Problem of Dominance, supra note 5; see also HUCKABEE, COOPERA-
TION OR CHAOS?, supra note 5, at 73-95.
236. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 899-900, 902-03 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
237. Id. at 899.
238. Insanity Defense In Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1982) (testi-
mony of Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Attorney General); cf. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 900
n.10.
proach, policy considerations, and evidentiary reasoning. 23 9
Nevertheless, in view of this, the Pohlot opinion, taking the position
that the mens rea model is built into the federal system is under-
standable. It now appears that there are major problems in attempt-
ing to retreat from the mens rea model; a step which the Justice
Department apparently wants to take.
B. Is It Strict Or Diminished Capacity Mens Rea?
Pohlot. places emphasis on the expertise of Professors Stephen
Morse and Peter Arenella. This is consistent with the fact that their
articles and testimony were considered by Congress during the devel-
opment of the 1984 Insanity Defense Reform Act.240 The opinion
seems to have accepted the "strict mens rea" concept described by
Professors Arenella241 and Morse 242 as Congress's intent.243
It is understandable that Pohlot accepted the strict mens rea ap-
proach as the intent of Congress since, in fact, some Department of
Justice officials and Senate reports emphasized this approach. For ex-
ample, Pohlot refers to testimony before the 1982 Senate Judiciary
Committee regarding the mens rea insanity defense. The opinion
notes that then-Attorney General William French Smith stated that
mental disorder evidence would rarely be admissible on the mens rea
elements. Pohlot further refers to testimony before a House of Rep-
resentatives subcommittee, where then-Associate Attorney General
Giuliani made similar statements.244 In a 1981 Senate report regard-
ing the mens rea insanity defense there is a statement indicating that
a strict version of the mens rea model would be used less frequently
than the insanity defense. Pohlot cites this report as including the
following language:
While the mens rea test, dependent as it is on the use of the phrase 'mental
disease or defect,' may be said to suffer from some of the same vagueness
problems [as the insanity defense] it should be noted that the reduction in
availability of the defenses reduces the harm and impact of the necessary
vagueness. 245
This implies that under the mens rea insanity defense mental disor-
der evidence would be less admissible than under a traditional in-
sanity defense.
The foregoing raises questions for serious consideration by federal
courts, Congress, the Justice Department, federal prosecutors, and
defense attorneys. These questions may be stated as follows:
239. Cf supra notes 6-12, 61-161 and accompanying text.
240. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 898 n.5.
241. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 1-2, 10-11, 15, 32.
242. Id. at 10-11, 15-17, 32.
243. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 900, 903-04.
244. Id. at 902-03.
245. 1& at 901 n.12.
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(1) Is Pohlot correct in adopting the strict mens rea approach, based
on positions expressed by Professors Morse and Arenella, as well as
those of Justice Department officials in support of the mens rea in-
sanity defense which Congress did not adopt? Or instead, should it
not be expected that federal courts will continue with the apparently
broader interpretation of the mens rea model in existing federal
cases such as United States v. Brawner?246
(2) Since former Assistant Attorney General (now federal District
Judge) D. Lowell Jensen specifically testified in 1983 regarding the
Insanity Defense Reform Act which had been submitted by the Ad-
ministration and was later passed by Congress and signed into law,
would not his testimony delineating a more liberal version of the
mens rea model more accurately reflect the correct legislative history
rather than the strict interpretation reflected in Pohlot?247
(3) Consistent with (1) and (2) above, is there any assurance that
other federal courts will follow the strict mens rea approach; or, will
there be a tendency to follow more liberal concepts such as those
which have occurred in California?248
(4) Consistent with all of the foregoing, will defense attorneys press
for (and federal courts approve) a more liberal version of the mens
rea model which has existed in the federal system for many years,
and has been consistently used to admit into evidence mental disor-
ders not serious enough to meet insanity defense requirements? 249
246. 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc); cf United States v. Gold, 661
F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1987); Huckabee, supra note 1, at 18-19.
247. Reform Of The Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 249-50
(1983); Huckabee, supra note 1, at 19-24.
248. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 898, 900 n.10, 904-05; Huckabee, supra note 1, at 2-8, 10-14,
26-28.
249. HUCKABEE, COOPERATION OR CHAOS?, supra note 5, at 30-51, 73-95; Huckabee,
Problem of Dominance, supra note 5, at 798-99; ef. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 20-21.
For example, in Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 91 (C.M.A. 1988) (presumably governed by
military law patterned after the 1984 Federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act), the
Court of Military Appeals stated that the accused "does not contend that he was suf-
fering from some mental disease or defect, and he specifically does not tender any
form of insanity defense. Indeed, his expert agrees that, given a few days' sleep, the
accused was a perfectly normal, healthy person." However, the court held that a por-
tion of the expert testimony should be admitted, stating: "We have no doubt whatever
that a psychiatrist is within his realm of expertise in describing the effects of sleep
deprivation, et al., on the human mind." Id. at 94. This occurred in a case in which the
accused was charged with unpremeditated murder of his eleven-year-old son. The case
illustrates the reasons why the support exists for drawing the line at the insanity de-
fense, which requires a mental disease or defect and provides a bottom line for evalu-
ating the effect of mental disorder on criminal responsibility.
The Pohiot opinion recognizes that the mens rea model authorizes
admission of mental disorders not meeting insanity defense require-
ments.2 5 0 How will courts know where to draw the line?
(5) What effect will the liberal version of the mens rea model2 51
adopted by the American Bar Association have on the interpretation
of the new legislation by federal courts? 25 2
(6) Is it not true that jurisdictions drawing a firm line at the in-
sanity defense probably do so because they are worried about such
potential problems as those mentioned in questions (1) through (5)
above?
Idaho, Montana, and Utah have adopted the mens rea insanity de-
fense, which Congress did not adopt.253 It will be interesting to
watch developments in those states to see whether some variation of
the liberal, diminished capacity mens rea approach ultimately
prevails over a strict mens rea interpretation.
X. USE OF MENTAL DISORDER AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL
INSANITY DEFENSE
What is the fate of mental disorder testimony and evidence
presented under the insanity defense if that defense is unsuccessful?
May it still be considered by the jury directly on mens rea? In
Muench-Worthing,254 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered this issue,255 noting that according to Fisher:25 6
it seems inescapable that it would have been proper to instruct the jury that
the evidence it did in fact hear concerning the defendant's mental illness
could not be considered by it in reaching its verdict on the mens rea question,
but only in its deliberations on the insanity question.2 57
The Muench-Worthing opinion further stated "We take Fisher at its
word: it condoned, though did not endorse as the wiser position, the
view that mental abnormality short of legal insanity is not a relevant
factor in determining whether an accused is guilty of murder in the
first or second degree."2 58 This would allow both a firm line to be
drawn at the insanity defense, and an instruction to the jury to disre-
gard the mental disorder evidence if it decides that insanity defense
requirements have not been met. This is consistent with the princi-
250. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 900.
251. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 92, § 7-6.2 (Supp. 1986); see supra note 193 and
accompanying text.
252. Huckabee, supra note 1, at 15-18, 32.
253. Id. at 26-28.
254. Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Worthing
v. Israel, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
255. Muench, 715 F.2d at 1141-42.
256. United States v. Fisher, 328 U.S. 463, 473, 476 (1946); see supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.
257. Muench, 715 F.2d at 1142.
258. Id.
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ple that a firm line may be drawn at the insanity defense to preclude
all evidence of mental disorder below that line, using the substantive
law approach, policy considerations, and evidentiary reasoning.259
The issues regarding the mens rea model in Pohlot260 arose from
the residue of mental disorder evidence after an unsuccessful asser-
tion of the insanity defense.26 1 However, as earlier noted, the Pohlot
opinion recognized the mens rea model.262 Thus, the issue was dis-
cussed in terms of whether the trial court was specific enough in in-
structing the jury that the mental disorder evidence could be
considered on mens rea. The court of appeals held that the instruc-
tion was not adequate. 263
This residue problem is not new. As trial defense counsel in 1954,
in a murder case tried before a United States Army court-martial, I
requested an instruction in circumstances similar to those in Pohlot.
Although military law recognized the mens rea model, the law of-
ficer refused the requested instruction. He stated that a more gen-
eral instruction regarding the mens rea elements would allow the
members of the court to adequately focus on the mental disorder evi-
dence with reference to its effect on mens rea. This ruling was up-
held on appeal. 26 4 However, in jurisdictions where the mens rea
model has not been authorized and is properly precluded, an instruc-
tion to the jury to disregard mental disorder evidence remaining af-
ter an unsuccessful insanity defense should be constitutional.2 65
Additionally, if juries have heard a massive presentation of mental
disorder evidence during an unsuccessful insanity defense, how is any
instruction from the court going to erase this from their evaluation of
mens rea? Nevertheless, jurisdictions desiring to reduce the effect of
259. See supra notes 6-12, 61-161 and accompanying text. This is also consistent
with the position of the Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794-95
(1952), which focused on the residue of mental disorder after the defendant had been
found sane under the insanity defense requirements. As noted earlier, in Leland, the
Court was discussing the issue in a state where the mens rea model was recognized. In
a state where it is not recognized, and is otherwise properly excluded, it seems clear
that an instruction to disregard the evidence of mental disorder could be given to the
jury after an unsuccessful insanity defense.
260. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710
(1988).
261. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 892, 894-95.
262. See supra notes 15-17, 49-51, 183-90 and accompanying text.
263. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 895.
264. United States v. Schick, 7 C.M.A. 419, 421, 425-29, 22 C.M.R. 209, 210, 215-19
(1956).
265. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
having the mens rea. model injected through this back door approach
should see that such an instruction is requested.
XI. TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OTHER THAN EXPERT OPINIONS
Pohlot refers to the fact that many of the cases focus on "'expert
psychiatric evidence' [and] not the use of any evidence of mental ab-
normality to negate mens rea."266 "Evidentiary rules that would bar
the testimony of the defendant himself, as would a rule barring all
evidence of mental abnormality on the issue of'mens rea, need partic-
ular justification."26 7 The opinion further indicates: "As this case
shows . . . expert psychiatric evidence is not the only evidence of
mental abnormality bearing on mens rea, for a defendant or other
witness may testify about mental abnormality. ' 26 8
Obviously, any testimony or evidence that is relevant and other-
wise admissible regarding the facts of mens rea should be admitted.
Nevertheless, despite decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,269 if
jurisdictions use the reasoning offered- in this article, they should
constitutionally be able to draw a firm line at the insanity defense
and keep out all types of testimony and evidence regarding mental
disorder-if the purpose of such testimony and evidence is to show
the effects of mental disorder (not meeting insanity defense require-
ments) on mens rea elements. Even using a case-by-case approach, it
is not at all clear how probative and relevant the history of psychiat-
ric and social problems of the defendant would be on mens rea
elements.
In regard to testimony of the defendant (or of other witnesses)
concerning the defendant's acts, conduct, or statements which may be
266. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 896 n.2 (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 901; cf id. at 902 n.12.
268. Id. at 905; cf Note, supra note 31, at 735-36, 738 n.17, 787. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has held that either psychiatric testimony or lay testimony detailing
the psychiatric and personal history of the defendant may be admitted, if relevant, to
cast doubt upon or to prove the defendant's intent (although a psychiatrist's opinion
on intent should be excluded). State v. Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d 282, 301-08, 361 N.W.2d
705, 715-18 (1985); State v. Repp, 122 Wis. 2d 246, 256, 362 N.W.2d 415, 419 (1985); see
also supra note 12 and accompanying text (indicating that some cases may only draw
the line at precluding expert opinions on mental disorder below the insanity defense
line); cf. Comment, The Psychiatric Expert in the Criminal Trial: Are Bifurcation
and the Rules Concerning Opinion Testimony On Ultimate Issues Constitutionally
Compatible?, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 493, 528-29 (1987). The comment emphasizes a less re-
stricted approach to admissibility of mental disorder evidence than is presented here.
However, the purpose of this article is to present the arguments which may have
swayed the Supreme Court in denying certiorari regarding the constitutional issues. In
addition to giving insight to jurisdictions desiring to limit the admissibility of mental
disorder evidence, this article may also give those who want to broaden such admissi-
bility the opportunity to focus the constitutional attacks more directly toward the is-
sues in terms of arguments which have been made to the Supreme Court.
269. See supra note 268.
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relevant to motive or intent,270 the same line may be drawn. If the
testimony or evidence is for the purpose of supporting a showing of
lack of mental capacity because of mental disorder, it may be pre-
cluded below the insanity defense line, if that line is otherwise prop-
erly drawn.
XII. REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT
Throughout this article there are indications of reasonable dis-
agreements among jurisdictions, courts, and authorities. The brief in
opposition to the Worthing petition for a writ of certiorari empha-
sizes that "the [C]onstitution does not compel the admission of evi-
dence of questionable reliability, especially when reasonable people
can and do reasonably disagree about the propriety of admitting
it."271
XIII. LEEWAY FOR EXPERIMENTATION
The brief in opposition to the Worthing petition asserts:
The states should be able to decide for themselves, within the bounds of rea-
son, whether to admit psychiatric evidence on a particular issue, as long as
there is a rational basis for their decision. Wisconsin should be given leeway
to continue to experiment with its evidentiary rules in this troublesome
area.
2 7 2
Such experimentation should be allowed to encompass not only evi-
dentiary rules but also policy considerations as well as the Substan-
tive law approach.273 Further, the brief274 cites three United States
Supreme Court cases: McKiever v. Pennsylvania,275 Powell v.
Texas,276 and Fay v. New York.277 In other contexts, those cases sup-
port the position that the issue "is a subject of considerable contro-
versy on which the states should be given leeway to experiment."2 78
It is of particular interest to note certain statements of the
Supreme Court in Powell v. Texas.2 79 Although the opinion focused
270. Cf. 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 107-121 (14th ed. 1985 &
Supp. 1986); Note, supra note 31, at 745 n.45.
271. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 2-3.
272. 1&i at 3.
273. Cf. supra notes 61-161 and accompanying text.
274. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 10.
275. 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
276. 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968).
277. 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947).
278. Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 10.
279. 392 U.S. at 536-37.
on chronic alcoholism, it discussed differences of opinions of medical
experts. The Court said:
The doctrines of actus rea, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and du-
ress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment
of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This
process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the
states.
2 8 0
The Court then referred to the insanity defense, stating: "Nothing
could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining
some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms."28 1 The Court also
discussed the experimentation with the insanity defense in the Dis-
trict of Columbia:
[F]ormulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate, that fruit-
ful experimentation, and freeze the developing productive dialogue between
law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold. It is simply not yet the
time to write into the Constitution formulas cast in terms whose meaning, let
alone relevance, is not yet clear either to doctors or to lawyers.2 8 2
Powell 283 clearly indicates that the Supreme Court is not yet ready to
draw a constitutional line applicable to the states regarding the in-
sanity defense. It is also probable that the Supreme Court would, not
set up a constitutional framework to specifically dictate rules regard-
ing the even more controversial issues involved in mental disorder
evidence below the insanity defense line.
The states are continuing to experiment. There remain major-
and reasonable--disagreements among jurisdictions, courts, and au-
thorities. The very existence of such disagreements helps keep the
issue from reaching a constitutional level.
XIV. CONCLUSION
Individual jurisdictions may want to evaluate the possibility of re-
ducing the use of mental disorder evidence in criminal cases. Juris-
dictions not now drawing the line at the insanity defense may want
to determine whether it is desirable and feasible to do so. Even juris-
dictions currently drawing that line may want to determine if any
loopholes exist through which mental disorder evidence is still being
admitted below the insanity defense line. Whichever status a juris-
diction is in, evaluation of the criminal justice system in terms of the
concepts discussed in this article may be helpful.
A major consideration, undoubtedly affecting the position of the
Supreme Court, is that a ruling on the constitutionality of precluding
mental disorder evidence below the insanity defense line would not
280. Id. at 536.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 536-37.
283. See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
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merely affect the District of Columbia and the thirteen states now
drawing that line.284 In addition, it could significantly impact the nu-
merous states presently admitting such evidence in only a limited ca-
pacity, such as to negate specific intent, purposefulness, or knowledge
(but not general intent), or only in murder cases to negate malice or
premeditation. 28 5 A ruling of unconstitutionality could cause these
jurisdictions to require admissibility of mental disorder directly on
mens rea across the board, and not limit it to the specific areas where
it is now admissible. Consequently, such a ruling could have a major
impact on the criminal justice systems in many jurisdictions. It ap-
pears that the Supreme Court will hesitate to take such a fundamen-
tal step in view of the major disagreements and the continuing need
for the states to experiment.
A major difficulty continues to be the conceptual confusion regard-
ing the insanity defense, mens rea, guilt, responsibility, and other
criminal law concepts. 28 6 A greater emphasis on understanding these
concepts could lead to more meaningful dialogue in the efforts to re-
solve these difficult problems.
284. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
285. 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 75, § 64(a), at 273-85; MELTON & PETRILA, supra
note 4, at 128-29.
286. See generally MacBain, The Insanity Defense: Conceptual Confusion and the
Erosion of Fairness, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1983).

